Journal article

Authors list: Paha, Johannes

Publication year: 2023

Pages: 357-366

Journal: Journal of Competition Law & Economics

Volume number: 19

Issue number: 3

ISSN: 1744-6414

eISSN: 1744-6422

DOI Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhad007

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Abstract: 
This article presents a model where the managers of two firms decide about adopting a sustainable production technology (or product). It demonstrates under what conditions a firm experiences a first mover disadvantage from going green, which may potentially be overcome by a sustainability agreement serving as a device for equilibrium selection in a coordination game with multiple equilibria. If the technology adoption game is, however, a prisoner's dilemma, the sustainability agreement must be structured like a hardcore cartel.

Harvard Citation style: Paha, J. (2023) SUSTAINABILITY AGREEMENTS AND FIRST MOVER DISADVANTAGES, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 19(3), pp. 357-366. https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhad007

APA Citation style: Paha, J. (2023). SUSTAINABILITY AGREEMENTS AND FIRST MOVER DISADVANTAGES. Journal of Competition Law & Economics. 19(3), 357-366. https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhad007