Journal article

Authors list: Otten, Kasper; Frey, Ulrich J.; Buskens, Vincent; Przepiorka, Wojtek; Ellemers, Naomi

Publication year: 2022

Journal: Nature Communications

Volume number: 13

Issue number: 1

eISSN: 2041-1723

Open access status: Gold

DOI Link: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-022-34160-5

Publisher: Nature Research

Abstract: 

How people cooperate to provide public goods is an important scientific question and relates to many societal problems. Previous research studied how people cooperate in stable groups in repeated or one-time-only encounters. However, most real-world public good problems occur in groups with a gradually changing composition due to old members leaving and new members arriving. How group changes are related to cooperation in public good provision is not well understood. To address this issue, we analyze a dataset from an online public goods game comprising approximately 1.5 million contribution decisions made by about 135 thousand players in about 11.3 thousand groups with about 234 thousand changes in group composition. We find that changes in group composition negatively relate to cooperation. Our results suggest that this is related to individuals contributing less in the role of newcomers than in the role of incumbents. During the process of moving from newcomer status to incumbent status, individuals cooperate more and more in line with incumbents.

Little is known about the dynamics of human cooperation in groups with changing compositions. Using data from a large-scale and long-term online public goods game, this study shows how group changes are associated with temporarily lower cooperation.

Harvard Citation style: Otten, K., Frey, U., Buskens, V., Przepiorka, W. and Ellemers, N. (2022) Human cooperation in changing groups in a large-scale public goods game, Nature Communications, 13(1), Article 6399. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-022-34160-5

APA Citation style: Otten, K., Frey, U., Buskens, V., Przepiorka, W., & Ellemers, N. (2022). Human cooperation in changing groups in a large-scale public goods game. Nature Communications. 13(1), Article 6399. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-022-34160-5