Journal article

How executive incentive design affects risk-taking: a literature review


Authors listKreilkamp, Niklas; Matanovic, Sascha; Schmidt, Maximilian; Wöhrmann, Arnt

Publication year2023

Pages2349-2374

JournalReview of Managerial Science

Volume number17

Issue number7

ISSN1863-6683

eISSN1863-6691

DOI Linkhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-022-00582-0

PublisherSpringer


Abstract
This paper presents a review of research regarding the effects of monetary executive incentives on risk-taking. More precisely, we investigate executives' risk-taking (i) in response to the curvature (steepness, convexity, concavity) of the compensation function and (ii) with regard to reference points. Thereby, we refine and update common textbook knowledge. In this vein, we identify essential moderators at the personal, firm, or environmental level that can be used to assess the effectiveness of the incentive scheme in a specific context. Implications for incentive system design in practice and paths for future research are discussed.



Citation Styles

Harvard Citation styleKreilkamp, N., Matanovic, S., Schmidt, M. and Wöhrmann, A. (2023) How executive incentive design affects risk-taking: a literature review, Review of Managerial Science, 17(7), pp. 2349-2374. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-022-00582-0

APA Citation styleKreilkamp, N., Matanovic, S., Schmidt, M., & Wöhrmann, A. (2023). How executive incentive design affects risk-taking: a literature review. Review of Managerial Science. 17(7), 2349-2374. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-022-00582-0


Last updated on 2025-26-06 at 14:44