Journalartikel

Autorenliste: Bannier, Christina E.

Jahr der Veröffentlichung: 2010

Seiten: 641-661

Zeitschrift: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Bandnummer: 166

Heftnummer: 4

ISSN: 0932-4569

DOI Link: https://doi.org/10.1628/093245610793524875

Verlag: Mohr Siebeck

Abstract: 

This paper studies the effects that heterogeneous multiple bank financing has on a firm's risk and information policy when the firm tries to maximize credit renegotiation efficiency. We find that a significant, yet limited, degree of relationship lending enables firms with high asset specificity to credibly signal their desire to abstain from strategic default. This allows the firm's policy to eliminate the risk of inefficient liquidation even for bleak cash-flow expectations. This holdup benefit comes at a cost, though: firms with low asset specificity cannot always eliminate the risk of coordination failure by their banks. 

Harvard-Zitierstil: Bannier, C. (2010) Is there a Holdup Benefit in Heterogeneous Multiple Bank Financing?, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 166(4), pp. 641-661. https://doi.org/10.1628/093245610793524875

APA-Zitierstil: Bannier, C. (2010). Is there a Holdup Benefit in Heterogeneous Multiple Bank Financing?. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 166(4), 641-661. https://doi.org/10.1628/093245610793524875